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Abstract
I examine optimal financial contracts between entrepreneurs, financial
intermediaries (venture capitalists) and other investors, which allocate both
cashflow rights and control rights to (a) motivate the venture capitalist to
monitor effectively the entrepreneur; (b) ensure that the efficient decision is
taken at the interim stage concerning project continuation and refinancing;
and (c) deter collusion between the entrepreneur and the venture capital-
ist at the expense of the other investors. The combination of asymmetric
information at the interim stage with the possibility of collusion yields op-
timal (collusion-proof) contracts that are consistent with several commonly
observed characteristics of venture capital financing.
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1. Introduction
The role of large investors as monitors has received considerable attention in the
existing theoretical and empirical literature on corporate finance. Much of this
attention has focused on the case of large public companies, where there may be
substantial gains from having a large shareholder who engages in active moni-
toring, thereby reducing the scope for opportunistic behaviour by management
(Shleifer and Vishny (1986)). However, ownership concentration also has costs,
including the possibility that large shareholders may themselves pursue private
benefits at the expense of minority shareholders.1 Private benefits are then likely
to be shared between management and block shareholders - effectively a form of
collusion - as suggested by some evidence.2
This naturally raises the question: how does ownership structure and more
generally the allocation of control rights and cashflow rights affect incentives to
monitor versus incentives to collude and pursue private benefits? This question is
equally important when we consider the case of entrepreneurial start-ups, which
are the main focus of the present paper. Here too the monitoring role of investors
such as banks and especially venture capitalists has received a great deal of atten-
tion in the literature.3 Moreover, there could in principle be plenty of scope for
collusion between venture capitalists and entrepreneurs, at the expense of other
investors. There are several possible interpretations of ”other investors” in this
context. First, the other investors can be interpreted as the limited partners in
a venture capital fund. Typically, these investors provide the bulk of the fund’s
capital, but they do not engage in active monitoring of the portfolio companies
and are ”uninformed” relative to the venture capitalist. A second possible inter-
pretation of the ”other investors” is that they represent non-venture investors,
who also generally do not engage in active monitoring.4 A third possible inter-
pretation is that of new investors who acquire a stake in the company when it is
taken public, and who will be less informed at this stage about the company than
the venture capitalist who has been closely involved with the company from the
start.
1Evidence of large shareholders obtaining private benefits of control at the expense of minority
shareholders is available for the USA (Barclay and Holderness (1989)), Sweden (Bergström and
Rydqvist (1990)), and Italy (Zingales (1994)).
2See, for example, Brickley, Lease and Smith (1988), Pagano and Röell (1998), and Pound
(1988). For a theoretical analysis of collusion between management and dominant shareholders
at the expense of small shareholders see Maug (2002).
3See, for example, Freixas and Rochet (1997) on banks and Gompers and Lerner (1999) and
Kaplan and Strömberg (2003) on venture capitalists.
4The involvement of nonventure investors in the financing of venture-backed companies is
well documented: see, for example, Gompers and Lerner (1999).
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These different interpretations of the ”other investors” suggest different pos-
sible forms of collusion at different stages in the company’s lifecycle. As will
become clear below, these collusion possibilities are closely interrelated and need
to be taken into account in the design of optimal contracts. The paper there-
fore develops a model of entrepreneurial finance in which collusion may occur,
in principle, at two different stages. Ex ante, when the financial intermediary
(venture capitalist) is needed to engage in active monitoring of the entrepreneur,
the two may collude so that the venture capitalist does not monitor (thereby
saving the effort cost of monitoring) and, as a consequence, the entrepreneur
chooses an ”inefficient” project that generates significant private benefits. Ex
post, when the entrepreneur and the venture capitalist learn some (private) infor-
mation about the project’s likelihood of success, they may collude to ensure the
project is continued (which requires further financing) even though it would be
efficient to liquidate. Such collusive side-agreements would typically entail some
form of transfer from the entrepreneur to the venture capitalist. This is unlikely to
occur through straightforward cash transfers (partly because the entrepreneur is
by assumption, cash-constrained, and partly because such bribes would be easy to
detect). Instead, the entrepreneur could allow the venture capitalist to gain from
taking (influencing) certain decisions (for example, concerning supplier contracts
or the recruitment of key employees).5 More generally, the entrepreneur could
generate benefits for the venture capitalist in a variety of ways by using corporate
resources, including ideas, knowledge and information.
The fact that entrepreneurs and venture capitalists could find ways of collud-
ing, to the detriment of the other investors, has important implications for the
design of financial contracts.6 Under the informational assumptions that seem to
correspond most closely to the context of venture capital financing, I find that
optimal collusion-proof contracts can take a very simple form, with the following
properties:
• the allocation of cashflow rights to the intermediary can be interpreted as a
convertible security (for example, convertible debt or preferred stock), or as
5There is plenty of empirical evidence showing that venture capitalists play a very active
role in negotiating with suppliers, recruiting senior management, and providing entrepreneurs
with access to consultants, investment bankers and lawyers (see Gompers and Lerner (1999),
Hellmann and Puri (2002), Kaplan and Strömberg (2003), and Sahlman (1990)). What has not
been noted is that this form of involvement by venture capitalists could, in principle, facilitate
collusion between entrepreneurs and venture capitalists.
6Of course, reputational concerns may help to mitigate the incentives to collude. But it is
unlikely that reputational concerns alone could be a sufficient deterrent (see section 3 below for
a fuller discussion). To the extent that reputational effects are not sufficient by themselves, the
allocation of cashflow rights and control rights matters, and the qualitative results obtained in
this paper continue to hold.
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a combination of debt and equity (but not straight debt or straight equity);
• control rights over the decision to continue or liquidate the project are given
to the intermediary.
This result depends crucially on two assumptions. First, that the intermedi-
ary’s monitoring skills are relatively scarce in the economy - the relative scarcity
of venture capitalists’ skills and expertise seems well-established. Second, that
it would be possible, albeit costly perhaps, for the entrepreneur and the inter-
mediary to collude at the expense of other investors. The result can clearly be
applied, therefore, if we interpret the intermediary as a venture capitalist. It is
not applicable, on the other hand, to the case of ”business angels” who finance en-
trepreneurial start-ups out of their own capital, without raising finance from other
investors.7 This is consistent with the empirical evidence (discussed in section 4)
showing that venture capitalists tend to be given predominantly convertible debt
or convertible preferred stock, while business angels generally hold common stock.
An important feature of optimal collusion-proof contracts is that they give the
intermediary both the power and the incentives to take the efficient continuation
decision. This is done through the allocation of both cashflow rights and control
rights. As noted above, the cashflow rights can be interpreted as a convertible
security: in this interpretation, the intermediary’s decision to exercise the con-
version option acts as a credible signal to potential new investors that the firm’s
prospects are ”good”. This is consistent with the empirical evidence suggesting
that venture capitalists play an important certification role (see the discussion
in section 4 below). Moreover, the control rights in the optimal contract en-
able the intermediary to force liquidation if he wishes: this is consistent with
the widespread use of redemption rights in venture capital contracts (discussed in
detail in section 4).
It seems therefore that the framework developed in this paper can account for a
number of commonly observed characteristics of venture capital financing. To my
mind, the paper’s main contribution lies in the fact that it is the first paper (to my
knowledge) which takes explicit account of the relationship between entrepreneurs,
venture capitalists and other investors, and the potential for collusion between
entrepreneurs and venture capitalists, to the detriment of the other investors.
Indeed, this is what drives the key results: the main features which correspond to
observed characteristics of venture capital financing emerge in this framework as
an optimal response to the threat of collusion between entrepreneurs and venture
capitalists, which therefore does not occur in equilibrium.
The paper is clearly related to two broad strands of the existing literature.
First, the literature on collusion in the presence of three-tier hierarchies (principal
7I am grateful to Alex Gümbel for drawing my attention to this point.
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- supervisor - agent).8 This literature has assumed risk aversion, transactions
costs of collusion or asymmetric information within the supervisor-agent coalition
in order to have a role for the supervisor (monitor). In the context of financial
intermediation, the present paper identifies a fourth reason for such a role, despite
the possibility of collusion : simply put, the monitor (intermediary) contributes his
own capital to the venture ex ante, thereby paying for (part of) the ex-post rents
he has to be given in order to deter collusion. The agency problem is therefore
alleviated by bringing the monitor on board.
Secondly, the present paper is obviously related to the very large literature on
venture capital;9 the closest papers to mine are perhaps the following. Casamatta
(2003) obtains different implications for the form of optimal contracts between
an entrepreneur and a financier, depending on whether the financier is a venture
capitalist or a business angel. In her model, the difference stems from the dif-
ferent magnitude of investments (venture capitalists are assumed to invest higher
amounts than business angels), rather than from the fact that business angels,
unlike venture capitalists, invest their own capital, without raising substantial
amounts from other investors. The two models therefore yield different predic-
tions; in particular, my model predicts, in contrast to hers, that the contracts
used by venture capitalists may well differ from those used by business angels
even if they invest similar amounts. Cestone (2000) and Hellmann (2000) ad-
dress, as I do, the allocation of cashflow rights and control rights; each of these
papers focuses on a quite different set of issues, and in this sense can be viewed
as complementary to mine.10
The plan of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents the model; section 3
examines the benchmark case of symmetric information at the interim stage, while
section 4 analyses optimal contracts under asymmetric information and discusses
their relation to venture capital contracts. Section 5 concludes.
8See Laffont and Rochet (1997) and Tirole (1992) for surveys of the theory of collusion in
organisations.
9On the use of convertible securities in venture capital financing see, among others, Berge-
mann and Hege (1998), Berglof (1994), Cornelli and Yosha (2003), Repullo and Suarez (1999),
and Schmidt (2003), as well as the papers referred to in the main text. On control rights see
Hellmann (1998).
10Cestone (2000) focuses on the potential trade-off between the need to encourage en-
trepreneurial initiative in the early stages of a venture and the need to elicit the venture capital-
ist’s support (help and advice) in later stages. Hellmann (2000) examines the optimal allocation
of cashflow rights and control rights between entrepreneurs and venture capitalists when there
is ex-ante uncertainty as to whether exit should eventually occur through an acquisition or an
IPO.
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2. The model
The model extends and modifies the basic model introduced by Holmström and
Tirole (1997). It has two periods and three dates, t=0,1,2. There are three
types of agent: entrepreneurs, monitors (intermediaries) and investors. At the
beginning of the first period, t=0, each entrepreneur decides whether to invest
in a project, which requires an initial expenditure equal to C0. At the end of the
first period, t=1, the state γ is realised. If the project is continued, it requires
further financing equal to C1 and will yield return R > 0 at t=2 with probability γ
and zero otherwise. Alternatively, the project can be liquidated at t=1, yielding
liquidation proceeds of L. The entrepreneur can raise finance from monitors
(intermediaries) and/or investors. All agents in the model are assumed to be risk
neutral; entrepreneurs and intermediaries are protected by limited liability.
2.1. Entrepreneurs
There is a continuum of entrepreneurs of unit mass. At t=0, each entrepreneur
(henceforth also called a firm) is endowed with own capital Af < C0 , and an
investment opportunity or idea. Entrepreneurs differ only by having different
amounts of own capital at t=0. Entrepreneurial capital is distributed according
to the cumulative distribution function G(A), which denotes the fraction of en-
trepreneurs with capital less than A. The aggregate amount of entrepreneurial
capital is Kf =
R
AdG(A).
Each entrepreneur faces considerable uncertainty about his project’s returns at
t=0: some of the uncertainty is resolved at t=1, when the state γ is realised. For
simplicity, γ is assumed to take one of two values: γG (”good” state) or γB (”bad”
state), with γG > γB > 0. If the project is continued, it will yield returns R at
t=2 with probability γ, and zero otherwise. Thus γ represents the probability of
success in the second period. Returns are assumed to be verifiable. The state
γ is observed by the entrepreneur; different assumptions will be made about its
observability by other agents as the analysis proceeds.
The entrepreneur can affect the probability of the good (γ = γG) or bad
(γ = γB) state occurring. Specifically, he can undertake some action(s) yielding
an additional private benefit B in the first period; the cost of this is to reduce the
probability of the good state. A moral hazard problem may then arise when the
project requires external finance. We can formalise the entrepreneur’s decision as
a choice between two projects: the ”good” project, in which the good state will
occur with probability pH , and the ”bad” project, in which the good state occurs
with a lower probability pL , but the entrepreneur receives the private benefit
B > 0 during the first period. In what follows I denote by ∆p = pH − pL > 0 the
increase in the probability of the good state occurring associated with choosing
6
the good project, and by ∆γ = γG − γB > 0 the difference in the probability of
success between the good state and the bad state.
2.2. Intermediaries (Monitors)
The crucial function of intermediaries in this model is monitoring, which can
alleviate the moral hazard problem associated with the entrepreneur’s project
choice. Monitoring enables an intermediary to reduce the scope for opportunistic
behaviour by the entrepreneur. I model this formally by assuming that, through
monitoring, the intermediary can reduce the entrepreneur’s private benefit from
undertaking the bad project to b, where B > b > 0. This effectively reduces the
entrepreneur’s opportunity cost of ”good behaviour”. There is plenty of evidence
of intensive monitoring by intermediaries such as venture capitalists: according to
Gorman and Sahlman (1989), lead venture investors visit each portfolio company
an average of 19 times per year, and spend 100 hours in direct contact (on site or by
phone) with the company. Close involvement by venture capitalists also entails, in
many cases, the provision of valuable services to the portfolio company: Sahlman
(1990) notes that venture capitalists help recruit and compensate key individuals,
work with suppliers and customers, and help establish tactics and strategy. This
too can be interpreted as another way of reducing the entrepreneur’s opportunity
cost of good behaviour.
The intermediary has to incur a private cost c > 0 in order to monitor a
project. Monitoring is assumed to be non-contractable; it will therefore only take
place if the intermediary is given appropriate incentives to monitor. I shall follow
Holmström and Tirole (1997) in assuming that the projects funded by an interme-
diary are perfectly correlated. As they argue, perfect correlation is an unrealistic
but convenient simplifying assumption. The key point is that without any corre-
lation and without diseconomies of scale in monitoring (i.e. every project costs c
to monitor, regardless of the number of projects the intermediary invests in), an
intermediary could, through diversification, commit to monitoring without need-
ing to inject his own capital into the projects (Diamond, 1984). I rule out this
possibility because I am interested in studying how financial contract design is
affected when intermediary capital is in scarce supply (implying that intermedi-
aries specialise in monitoring): I therefore need a model in which the amount of
intermediary capital available in the economy matters.
Some degree of project correlation is in fact a much more plausible assumption
than no project correlation, for a number of reasons, including the possibility of
macroeconomic, industry- or sector-specific shocks, particularly for intermediaries
whose monitoring skills lead to specialisation in dealing with certain industries
or sectors (e.g. venture capitalists). The assumption of perfect correlation is
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extreme, but it simplifies the analysis. In particular, it means that we can focus
on studying individual contracts between the entrepreneur and an intermediary,
without modelling explicitly the intermediary’s other investments, since there are
no gains from cross-pledging the returns from different projects.
I shall denote by α the gross expected rate of return (per period), net of
monitoring costs, demanded by intermediaries at t=0. The equilibrium value of α
will be determined by the interaction between supply and demand for intermediary
capital. Km will represent the aggregate amount of intermediary capital.
2.3. Investors
In contrast to intermediaries (monitors), other investors are assumed to be too
small to monitor (they also typically lack the necessary skills). For this reason,
they shall generally be referred to as ”uninformed investors”. Investors demand
a gross expected rate of return per period equal to ∂, which is normalised to one.
There are many uninformed investors in each period, so that it is always possible
for the entrepreneur to raise finance from uninformed investors as long as he can
credibly promise them the required rate of return, ∂ = 1.
2.4. The projects
The following assumptions will be made about the projects. Firstly, continuation
is efficient at t=1 in the good state:
(A1) γGR− C1 > L
Secondly, liquidation is efficient at t=1 in the bad state:
(A2) γBR− C1 < L
Thirdly, it is efficient to invest in the good project ex ante, even if it requires
monitoring:
(A3) pH(γGR− C1) + (1− pH)L ≥ C0 + c
Finally, it is never efficient to invest in the bad project:
(A4) B + pL(γGR− C1) + (1− pL)L < C0
These assumptions mean that, if the entrepreneur could finance the project
entirely out of own capital, he would choose the good project at t=0, continue it
at t=1 if γ = γG, and liquidate at t=1 if γ = γB. In what follows, the analysis will
focus on how these ”first-best” choices may be induced even when the entrepreneur
is capital-constrained.
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2.5. Information
I shall consider two different informational assumptions concerning the state, γ,
at t=1. In section 3, as a benchmark case, I assume that the realisation of γ
is observed by all agents at t=1. In section 4, I focus on the case where the
entrepreneur and the intermediary observe γ at t=1 but outside investors do not
(as in, for example, Admati and Pfleiderer (1994), Rajan (1992) and Schmidt
(2003)).
2.6. Time line
t = 0 t = 1 t = 2
________________________________________
Financial contracts Realisation of γ. Project
signed. Decision to returns
Monitoring? continue or realised.
Entrepreneur chooses liquidate.
good or bad project.
3. Symmetric information about γ: firm prospects at t=1
are publicly observable
This section assumes that the realisation of the state γ at t=1 is publicly observ-
able and contractable. In particular, contracting parties at t=0 can agree that
the project will be continued at t=1 if and only if the firm’s prospects are good
(γ = γG), thereby ensuring ex post efficiency. Since this removes any potential
moral hazard problem associated with the continuation decision, financing pos-
sibilities for this case depend only on ex ante moral hazard (the moral hazard
associated with the entrepreneur’s project choice and the intermediary’s monitor-
ing decision). As a benchmark, we consider first the case where the possibility of
collusion is ruled out a priori : that is, optimal contracts between entrepreneurs,
intermediaries and investors do not need to take into account the possibility of
(secret) side agreements between some of the contracting parties. The results for
this case are simply the two-period analogue of those obtained by Holmström and
Tirole (1997), and are described by Proposition 1 below.
Financing possibilities are determined by the extent to which the entrepreneur
is capital-constrained, relative to two (endogenous) threshold levels. It is useful
to define the threshold levels here :
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A∗ ≡ C0 − L− pH [γGR− C1 − L− (B/∆p)]
A∗∗(α) ≡ C0 − L− pH [γGR− C1 − L− ((b+ c)/∆p)]− cpL/α2∆p
We can now state :
all proofs are in the Appendix.
Proposition 1. (a) (direct finance) When Af ≥ A∗, the entrepreneur under-
takes the good project, raising all the required external finance from uninformed
investors.
(b) (mixed finance) When A∗ > Af ≥ A∗∗(α), the entrepreneur undertakes
the good project by turning to an intermediary, who will engage in (costly) mon-
itoring.
(c) (binding financial constraint) When Af < A∗∗(α), the entrepreneur does
not undertake any project.
The intuition for this result is as follows. To ensure that the entrepreneur
chooses the good project (which has a higher probability of success, but lower
private benefits), he must be given a sufficiently large share of the project’s value
when it is successful. This share is denoted Rf . The project income that can be
pledged to uninformed investors is therefore equal to the residual share R − Rf ,
together with the full value of liquidation proceeds L in the event of liquidation.
This puts a bound on the maximum amount of external finance that can be raised
from uninformed investors, given by the investors’ break-even constraint. If the
entrepreneur does not have sufficient own capital to make up the shortfall between
this maximum amount of external finance and the required expenditure for the
project, the investment cannot be undertaken relying only on direct finance (i.e.
without monitoring). It may then be possible to finance the project by turning
to an intermediary: monitoring reduces the entrepreneur’s opportunity cost of
choosing the good project, and hence reduces the share of returns that has to be
pledged to the entrepreneur to satisfy his incentive compatibility constraint.
Obviously this will improve financing possibilities relative to the no-monitoring
case only if monitoring services are not too costly. The cost of monitoring services
depends on two things: firstly, the cost c incurred by the intermediary when he
monitors, for which he has to be compensated; secondly, the difference between
the rate of return demanded by intermediaries in equilibrium, α, and the rate of
return demanded by uninformed investors, equal to one. Specifically, it follows
from Proposition 1 that monitoring will be valuable (i.e. A∗∗(α) < A∗) if and only
if:
(A5) pH(B − b)− c[pH − (pL/α2)] > 0
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In what follows I rule out the less interesting case when monitoring services
are too costly, and assume that condition (A5) holds.
The equilibrium expected rate of return on intermediary capital, α, is obtained
by equating the aggregate supply and demand for intermediary capital in the
economy (assuming that there is no excess supply of intermediary capital at the
minimum acceptable rate of return, equal to one). Specifically, α is determined
by the following equilibrium condition :
Km = Am(α)[G(A
∗)−G(A∗∗(α))], where Am(α) = cpL/α2∆p
Am(α) represents the minimum amount of intermediary capital that has to
be provided for each project requiring monitoring (i.e. in the range A∗ > Af ≥
A∗∗(α)). The need for intermediary capital arises for the following reason. The
intermediary has to be induced to monitor: just like the entrepreneur, he is pro-
tected by limited liability, so that monitoring incentives can only be provided by
guaranteeing him a sufficiently large share of the project’s return when successful.
Since there is a strictly positive probability of success even when the intermedi-
ary does not monitor, the expected value of the project income that has to be
pledged to the intermediary to satisfy his incentive compatibility constraint is
strictly greater than the value of his monitoring cost, c. The intermediary there-
fore ”pays” for these expected rents at the beginning, by contributing capital
Am(α) to the project.
However, he may not pay the full value of these expected rents, in the fol-
lowing sense. When intermediary capital in the economy is scarce, the expected
rate of return demanded by intermediaries exceeds the expected rate of return
demanded by uninformed investors (α > 1), implying that intermediaries obtain
strictly positive expected rents. Another way of thinking about this is that inter-
mediaries essentially obtain a premium because of their monitoring skills, which
are relatively scarce in the economy. As a consequence, entrepreneurs will de-
mand only the minimum amount of intermediary capital, Am(α), consistent with
the provision of monitoring incentives. Any additional requirement for external
finance will be met directly from uninformed investors.
3.1. Collusion
The results summarised in Proposition 1 assume that the possibility of collusion
can be ruled out a priori. If this is not the case, it can easily be verified that
the entrepreneur and the intermediary (in the mixed finance case) will have an
incentive to collude during the first period so that the intermediary does not
monitor. This follows from the fact that, in the optimal contract when collusion
is ruled out exogenously, the intermediary is just indifferent between monitoring
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and not monitoring (his incentive compatibility constraint is binding), while the
entrepreneur can be made strictly better off if the intermediary does not monitor
(he can choose the bad project and obtain private benefits of value B). The
entrepreneur would therefore like to induce the intermediary not to monitor, if
this is not too costly.
How reasonable is it to assume away the possibility of collusion a priori ? One
argument in favour of such an assumption might be that the entrepreneur is, by
definition, capital-constrained : where would he find the resources necessary to
induce the intermediary to collude ? This objection does not seem convincing,
since the entrepreneur will typically be in a position that allows him to grant
some private benefits to the intermediary, if he wishes; for example, by using
corporate resources (including ideas, knowledge and information) to benefit the
intermediary, as noted in the introduction. A more persuasive argument might
be that the intermediary will not be willing to collude because he will be con-
cerned about the possible damage to his reputation. There are two aspects to
this argument. Firstly, there is the possibility that investors might discover ex
post that collusion has taken place. However, this is unlikely if sufficient care is
taken in choosing the form of the side transfers. A good example here, particu-
larly in the case of high-technology start-ups, would be the sharing of valuable
knowledge and information that the entrepreneur possesses and/or acquires in the
early stages of the venture. Secondly, an intermediary who systematically colludes
with entrepreneurs instead of monitoring the projects will build up, over time, a
poorer track record for project success than an intermediary who never shirks on
monitoring. This will obviously affect his reputation in the market and hence his
ability to stay in business. While concern over such long-term reputational effects
will undoubtedly play a role, it seems unlikely that it will provide, on its own, a
sufficiently powerful deterrent to collusion at all times. Thus simply ruling out
the possibility of collusion by assumption does not seem justified.
The foregoing discussion motivates the more general analysis that follows,
which will allow for the possibility of collusion. It is perhaps worth emphasizing
that collusion will not take place in equilibrium: the difference with the case ex-
amined earlier is that collusion will now be ruled out endogenously, through the
optimal design of financial contracts. As discussed above, collusion would require
some form of transfer from the entrepreneur to the intermediary, to induce the
latter not to monitor. The simplest way to capture the different possible ways
in which collusive transfers might occur is through a linear collusion technology:
that is, by assuming that a transfer which costs S to the giver benefits the receiver
by an amount kS.11 We assume that 1 ≥ k > 0 : the case where k < 1 implies the
11See Tirole (1992). The no-collusion case examined earlier (Proposition 1) corresponds to
assuming that k = 0, since in this case a collusive transfer from the entrepreneur would bring
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existence of transactions costs of collusion, including, for example, the effect of
reputational concerns as discussed above, which would tend to reduce the benefit
to the receiver. In principle, the case where k > 1 cannot be ruled out: for exam-
ple, the entrepreneur might possess some private information that is potentially
more valuable to the intermediary than to himself. In the remainder of the paper,
we focus attention on what we consider to be the most plausible case, 1 ≥ k > 0.
With this assumption we obtain the following result:
Proposition 2. Allowing for the possibility of collusion (side transfers at rate
k (1 ≥ k > 0)) raises the minimum amount of entrepreneurial capital required to
undertake the good project with mixed finance to:
A∗∗1 (α) ≡ A∗∗(α) + pHk(B − b)[1 − (1/α2)]/∆p, where A∗∗(α) is the critical
threshold in the absence of collusion (Proposition 1).
Proposition 2 shows that, even though collusion does not occur in equilibrium,
the threat of collusion has an impact on financing constraints. The difference be-
tween A∗∗1 (α), the critical threshold level of entrepreneurial capital when collusion
is deterred endogenously, and A∗∗(α), the critical threshold level when collusion
is assumed away exogenously, can be thought of as measuring the economic cost
of the possibility of collusion. It is an opportunity cost, since it represents lost
opportunities to undertake good projects. This cost is obviously increasing in k,
reflecting the relative ease with which collusion can take place; moreover, it is
increasing in α, the equilibrium rate of return on intermediary capital.
The intuition for this result is as follows. For a given collusion technology,
there are two ways of preventing collusion, namely increasing the entrepreneur’s
share of the project’s success returns, Rf (thereby reducing his potential gain from
collusion, and hence the maximum side transfer he would be willing to make), and
increasing the intermediary’s share of success returns, Rm (thereby increasing his
opportunity cost of collusion, and hence the minimum side transfer he would
be willing to accept). At the margin, increasing the share of success returns
pledged to the entrepreneur requires an equivalent increase in entrepreneurial
capital, whereas increasing the share of success returns pledged to the interme-
diary requires, at most, only a smaller increase in entrepreneurial capital, since
the intermediary can provide additional capital. Thus when the entrepreneur is
sufficiently capital-constrained, collusion is prevented by increasing the intermedi-
ary’s share of success returns: this has a cost when intermediary capital is scarce
(α > 1), because the intermediary extracts some rents.
It is interesting to compare this result with existing results in the collusion
literature, which has not specifically addressed the implications of the possibility
no benefit to the intermediary, who would therefore refuse any offer to collude.
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of collusion between entrepreneurs and financial intermediaries such as venture
capitalists. The existing literature on collusion in three-tier hierarchies assumes
risk aversion (as in Tirole (1986)), the existence of transactions costs of collusion,
i.e. k < 1, (see Tirole (1992)), or asymmetric information within the coalition (as
in Felli (1990)), in order to have a role for the intermediary (supervisor). Without
any of these assumptions, the value of the rents that have to be granted to the
supervisor to deter collusion is equal to the reduction in the agent’s rents which
is achieved by employing the supervisor. The principal therefore gains nothing
from employing the supervisor. In the present paper, on the other hand, there
can be a role for the intermediary even though we are assuming risk neutrality
and symmetric information within the coalition, and even if we assume there are
no transactions costs of collusion, i.e. k = 1.
Specifically, it follows from Propositions 1 and 2 that :
Corollary 1. Assume k = 1 (there are no transactions costs of collusion).
Financial intermediation (monitoring) is valuable, i.e. A∗∗1 (α) < A
∗, if and only if
the following condition holds :
pH(B− b)/α2−c[pH−(pL/α
2)] > 0
Intermediaries therefore have a role as long as α is not too large, in the sense
made precise by corollary 1. The reason is the following. It is still the case that
the ex post rents that have to be granted to the intermediary to prevent collusion
are equal to the reduction in the entrepreneur’s ex post rents which is achieved
by inducing the intermediary to monitor. However, the intermediary can ”pay”
for a greater share of these ex post rents by contributing capital ex ante. Thus
bringing the intermediary (monitor) on board will alleviate the agency problem,
as long as the opportunity cost of intermediary capital, α, is not too high.
4. Asymmetric information about γ: outside investors do
not observe firm prospects at t=1
This section assumes, more realistically, that outside investors do not observe the
realisation of γ at t=1, whereas the entrepreneur and the intermediary (the latter,
in the case of mixed finance) do. We consider briefly direct finance, then focus on
mixed finance.
4.1. Direct finance
The implications of asymmetric information for the possibility of direct finance
are straightforward. For the project to be feasible under direct finance, the en-
trepreneur must be given incentives to take the efficient continuation/liquidation
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decision at t=1, based on his private information about the state γ. Specifically,
his share of liquidation proceeds, Lf , must be such that he prefers liquidation in
the bad state (Lf ≥ γBRf) and continuation in the good state (γGRf ≥ Lf).
This contrasts with the symmetric information case analysed in section 3, where
the entrepreneur’s share of liquidation proceeds could be set equal to zero. The
entrepreneur’s ex ante incentive compatibility constraint requires his share of the
project’s success returns, Rf , to be sufficiently greater than Lf to induce him to
choose the good project. With Lf strictly positive, Rf must also increase. Thus
a greater share of the project’s income has to be pledged to the entrepreneur, im-
plying that the minimum amount of entrepreneurial capital required to undertake
the project is strictly greater than under symmetric information. The following
result shows the precise magnitude of this effect.
Proposition 3. Assume that γ is observed by the entrepreneur at t=1 but
not by outside investors. Then the entrepreneur can undertake the good project
raising all the required external finance from uninformed investors if, and only if,
Af ≥ A∗A ≡ A∗+γBB/∆γ∆p, where A∗ is the critical threshold for direct finance
under symmetric information (Proposition 1).
As noted above, the entrepreneur’s share of liquidation proceeds under asym-
metric information is bounded below by the need to provide him with the right
incentives to choose the efficient continuation/liquidation decision. Thus, what
matters for the firm’s ability to raise external finance is not the full value of
liquidation proceeds (collateral), as was the case under symmetric information,
but rather the maximum liquidation value (collateral) that can be pledged to in-
vestors, which will be strictly lower by Lf . This, together with the reduction in
pledgeable success returns needed to satisfy the entrepreneur’s ex ante ICC, de-
termines the shortfall in external finance which has to be compensated for by an
increase in the entrepreneur’s own capital contribution. It is worth relating this
result to Holmström and Tirole (1997): in their model the fact that entrepreneurs
with insufficient own capital cannot raise on financial markets the external finance
they would need to undertake good projects is due entirely to the ex ante moral
hazard problem associated with project choice. In the present paper, there is an
additional effect due to asymmetric information about the firm’s prospects at the
interim stage, which exacerbates financing constraints and reduces the number of
good projects that can be undertaken by accessing directly financial markets.
It is also worth comparing the impact of asymmetric information about γ on
the possibility of direct finance, analysed here, with its impact on the possibil-
ity of mixed finance in the absence of collusion, analysed in section 4.2.1 below.
The critical threshold for direct finance increases (Proposition 3), while the cor-
responding threshold for mixed finance is unchanged (Proposition 4). The reason
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is that with only one informed party, the entrepreneur, implementing the optimal
continuation/liquidation decision requires increasing his share of project income,
which increases the need for entrepreneurial capital, as noted above. By contrast,
with two informed parties (the entrepreneur and the intermediary), it is possible
to implement the optimal continuation/liquidation decision (relying on subgame
perfect implementation) without increasing either party’s share of the project’s
returns in equilibrium, provided the possibility of collusion is ruled out a priori
(see below for a fuller discussion).
4.2. Mixed finance
The remainder of section 4 focuses on the case of mixed finance in which external
finance is provided partly by uninformed investors and partly by an intermedi-
ary, who must be given appropriate incentives to engage in active monitoring.
We assume that the entrepreneur and the intermediary observe the realisation
of γ at t=1, unlike outside investors. That is, the intermediary always has an
informational advantage over uninformed investors ex post. This assumption,
standard in the corporate finance literature (see, for example, Rajan (1992), Ad-
mati and Pfleiderer (1994), and Schmidt (2003)), is intended to capture the idea
that the intermediary has easier access to information about the firm’s progress
and prospects than outside investors, together with the knowledge and expertise
required to interpret the information correctly. For example, venture capitalists
typically concentrate their investments in industries or sectors that they know and
understand particularly well, having often worked in them (e.g. as entrepreneurs)
prior to becoming venture capitalists. This is likely to be especially important for
high-technology industries, where considerable technical expertise may be needed
to evaluate progress in the early stages of a venture.
4.2.1. Collusion ruled out a priori
Just as in section 3, we begin by considering the benchmark case in which the
possibility of collusion is ruled out a priori. The assumed informational structure
implies that there are always two informed parties at t=1, the entrepreneur and
the intermediary. Ex ante, contracts can therefore be designed to ensure that
information about the state γ will be obtained from the informed parties at t=1,
and used to implement the efficient continuation/liquidation decision. In the
absence of collusion, this can be achieved at no additional cost; that is, the fact
that the realisation of γ is only observed by the entrepreneur and the intermediary
need not impose any restriction on financing possibilities relative to the mixed
finance case analysed in Proposition 1, section 3, where the realisation of γ was
assumed to be publicly observable at t=1. The reason is that we can rely on
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subgame perfect implementation12 to elicit information about γ from the two
informed parties without needing to increase their share of project income in
equilibrium. This result is summarised in Proposition 4 below.
Proposition 4. Assume that γ is observed by the entrepreneur and the inter-
mediary at t=1 but not by outside investors, and that collusion is not feasible.
Then:
(a) the entrepreneur can undertake the good project under mixed finance if,
and only if, Af ≥ A∗∗(α), where A∗∗(α) is the critical threshold under symmetric
information (given in Proposition 1);
(b) optimal contracts, which allow the project to be financed whenever Af ≥
A∗∗(α), have the following properties: (i) the equilibrium payoffs of the en-
trepreneur and the intermediary in the event of liquidation are equal to zero
(Lf = Lm = 0); and (ii) information about γ is obtained from the intermediary
and the entrepreneur at t=1 through a sequential mechanism which requires their
agreement for the project to be continued.
Proposition 4(b) shows that, in general, optimal contracts with asymmetric
information between the informed ”insiders” and the uninformed outside investors
with no possibility of collusion are not consistent with the fact that venture cap-
italists typically hold convertible securities. These represent a claim on at least
some of the proceeds in the event of liquidation, which is not consistent with
Proposition 4(b)(i). Moreover, the sequential mechanism required to elicit infor-
mation about γ (which relies on subgame perfect implementation, as discussed
above) cannot be interpreted as a convertible security.
The allocation of control rights over the liquidation decision that emerges in
these optimal contracts does embody an important feature of observed venture
capital contracts, namely the fact that the intermediary has the power to force
liquidation. This is consistent with the widespread use of redemption rights,
discussed in detail in section 4.2.2 below. On the other hand, the optimal contracts
described by Proposition 4 also require the entrepreneur to have the power to
force liquidation. The empirical evidence on this is less clear-cut. The reason
is that the entrepreneur would typically need to have control of the board to
initiate a liquidation; moreover, he may need a voting majority to ensure that
the decision is approved (see Smith (2001) and Kaplan and Strömberg (2003)).13
In their study of 213 venture capital investments, Kaplan and Strömberg (2003)
12Essentially this entails giving one party incentives to ”call the other’s bluff” if the other
tries to ”cheat”, so as to obtain ”good” behaviour in equilibrium. For an excellent survey which
discusses subgame perfect implementation extensively, see Moore (1992).
13Board rights and voting rights can differ in venture capital contracts through the use of
explicit agreements on the election of directors (see Kaplan and Strömberg (2003)).
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found that entrepreneurs (founders) had the majority of the board seats in 14% of
cases, and venture capitalists in 25% of cases. In the remainder of cases neither had
control, implying an important role for other board members; however, these were
individuals mutually agreed upon by the venture capitalists and the entrepreneurs
(founders), suggesting that they could not be counted upon to side systematically
with the latter. As for voting rights, the same study revealed that entrepreneurs
had a voting majority in at most 24% of all financings, the corresponding figure for
venture capitalists being 53%.14 This suggests that in many cases entrepreneurs
do not have the power to force liquidation.
Some intuition for the results described by Proposition 4 can be obtained by
comparing them with those presented in section 3. Under symmetric information,
ex ante incentives were provided by pledging to the entrepreneur and to the inter-
mediary a sufficiently large share of the project’s success returns, and a zero share
of any proceeds in the event of liquidation. Ex post efficiency could be guaranteed
simply by specifying in the contract the efficient continuation decision contingent
on γ, since γ was assumed to be contractable. When γ is only observed by the
entrepreneur and the intermediary ex post, as we assume in this section, it is not
directly contractable; the information has to be elicited from the two informed
parties.
There is some tension between the need to elicit information about γ and the
allocation of cashflow rights that was optimal under symmetric information. In
particular, when the entrepreneur and the intermediary receive nothing in the
event of liquidation (all the proceeds go to uninformed investors), they both al-
ways prefer continuation to liquidation (since γBRm > 0 and γBRf > 0), which
might induce them to claim that the state is good even when this is not the case.
This potential difficulty can be addressed using a simple sequential mechanism
(see the Appendix for an example), with the property that the entrepreneur and
the intermediary share (sequentially) the control rights over the continuation deci-
sion; in particular, each party can force liquidation, so that continuation requires
agreement. Notice however that this type of mechanism is not collusion-proof:
in the bad state, γ = γB, the intermediary and the entrepreneur clearly have
an incentive to collude to secure higher payoffs. The next section addresses this
point, and more generally the issue of collusion.
14The calculation of voting rights is complicated by the fact that some of these are contingent
on subsequent management performance and stock vesting milestones or contingencies. Kaplan
and Strömberg deal with this difficulty by calculating both a minimum and a maximum number
of votes for the venture capitalists, depending on future contingencies, and the corresponding
votes for the entrepreneurs. In the text I report the figures for the minimum contingency case,
which tends to overestimate the control rights of the entrepreneurs. In the maximum contingency
case, venture capitalists have a voting majority in 69% of all financings, and entrepreneurs have
a voting majority in only 12% of financings.
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4.2.2. Collusion
When information about the state γ has to be elicited from the entrepreneur
and the intermediary ex post, there is greater scope for collusion than in the
symmetric information case analysed in section 3. As before, the entrepreneur
and the intermediary may collude ex ante, at t=0, so that the intermediary does
not monitor, and the entrepreneur chooses the bad project yielding private benefits
B. They may also collude ex post, at t=1, so as to induce continuation even in
the bad state, which gives them expected payoffs γBRm and γBRf , respectively.
Moreover, while ex-ante collusion would require, as in the symmetric information
case considered in section 3, a collusive transfer from the entrepreneur to the
intermediary, ex-post collusion could occur even in the absence of any collusive
transfers. The reason is that when the entrepreneur and the intermediary do not
receive any of the proceeds in the event of liquidation, both parties stand to gain
from continuing the project in the bad state. The fact that ex-post collusion
could occur in the absence of collusive transfers means that the collusion case
considered below will not correspond to the no-collusion case examined above,
even when k = 0. The following result summarises the implications of these
collusion possibilities for financing constraints and investment, and for the form
of optimal financial contracts.
Proposition 5. Assume γ is observed by the entrepreneur and the intermediary
at t=1, but not by outside investors. Then:
(a) allowing for the possibility of collusion (side transfers at rate k (1 ≥ k > 0))
raises the minimum amount of entrepreneurial capital required to undertake the
good project with mixed finance to:
A∗∗2 (α) ≡ A∗∗1 (α) + γB(c + kB)[1 − (1/α2)]/∆p∆γ, where A∗∗1 (α) is the cor-
responding critical threshold with symmetric information, given in Proposition
2;
(b) optimal collusion-proof contracts, which allow the good project to be fi-
nanced whenever Af ≥ A∗∗2 (α), have the following properties: (i) the intermedi-
ary is given control rights over the decision to continue or liquidate the project
at t=1; and (ii) the allocation of cashflow rights provides the intermediary with
incentives to take the efficient continuation/liquidation decision; this entails giv-
ing the intermediary a share of the proceeds in the event of liquidation equal to
Lm = γB(Rm + kRf).
Financing constraints and investment
Comparing Proposition 5 with Proposition 2 shows the magnitude of the ef-
fect on financing constraints due to asymmetric information about γ; that is, the
additional effect associated with the possibility of ex post collusion when infor-
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mation about γ has to be elicited from the informed insiders. In principle, there
are two ways of deterring the entrepreneur and the intermediary from colluding to
continue the project in the bad state: increasing the entrepreneur’s share of liqui-
dation proceeds and increasing the intermediary’s share of liquidation proceeds.
When the entrepreneur is sufficiently capital-constrained, only the second option
is available. Raising the intermediary’s share of liquidation proceeds also requires
an increase in his share of the project’s success returns, to satisfy his incentive
compatibility constraint. Both increases are costly when intermediary capital is
scarce (α > 1), which exacerbates the entrepreneur’s financing constraint.
Optimal contracts and venture capital
Proposition 5 shows that optimal collusion-proof contracts are consistent with
commonly observed characteristics of venture capital contracts. First, the in-
termediary is given control rights over the continuation decision. In particular,
he is given both the right and the incentives to liquidate the project in the bad
state. The intuition for this is as follows. The possibility of collusion means that
we can no longer implement the optimal continuation/liquidation decision while
reducing the two informed parties’ equilibrium payoffs in the bad state to zero
by giving one party the incentive to ”call the other’s bluff” as the parties would
collude to secure higher payoffs. The optimal continuation decision can only be
implemented (and collusion deterred) by increasing the entrepreneur’s and/or the
intermediary’s equilibrium payoffs in the event of liquidation. To minimise the
need for entrepreneurial capital, we rely on the second option. This implies giving
the intermediary the power and the incentives to liquidate the project in the bad
state.15 This is consistent with the use of redemption rights in venture capital
contracts: as Gompers (1997) notes, these rights imply that ”essentially, the ven-
ture capitalists can force the firm to repay the face value of the investment at
any time. This mechanism can often be used to force liquidation”.16 Second, the
15Notice that, in contrast with the results of Proposition 4, there is no need to give the
entrepreneur the right to liquidate. Indeed, whether the entrepreneur has this right or not
becomes irrelevant, since he would never have the incentive to exercise it, given his cashflow
rights.
16Venture capitalists’ redemption rights can take one of two forms: mandatory redemption
rights and optional investor redemption (”put”) rights. Mandatory redemption requires the
company to begin repurchasing shares at a specified date, usually subject to waiver by the
venture capitalists. Optional investor redemption rights, which are much more common, allow
venture capitalists to force the repurchase of their shares at their discretion. They can typically
be exercised after a given date. Thus with both types of redemption right, the venture capitalist
essentially acquires liquidation rights from a given date onwards. Earlier in the venture capital
relationship, the venture capitalist effectively controls the continuation / liquidation decision
through the use of staged financing and negative covenants. For a more detailed discussion, see
Smith (2001) and Kaplan and Strömberg (2003).
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allocation of cashflow rights is also consistent with common practice in venture
capital finance, where convertible securities (convertible preferred equity and con-
vertible debt) are the most commonly used financial instruments, as noted earlier.
In particular, under plausible assumptions,17 the intermediary’s payoffs can be in-
terpreted as the payoffs to a convertible security: let the intermediary hold a debt
claim with face value equal to Lm and an option to convert this to an equity share
which will have value Rm at t=2 if the project succeeds.
The intermediary clearly has an incentive to continue the project and exercise
the conversion option in the good state, since the expected payoff in this case,
γGRm, exceeds the payoff from liquidation, Lm, (because of the intermediary’s ex
ante incentive constraint), which in turn is greater than the expected payoff from
continuing without exercising the conversion option, γGLm. In the bad state, on
the other hand, the intermediary prefers liquidation, since his payoff in this case,
Lm, is greater than or equal to the highest possible expected payoff from colluding
with the entrepreneur to continue the project (given by γBRm + kγBRf = Lm if
the intermediary exercises the conversion option, and γBLm+kγBRf < Lm if the
intermediary does not exercise the conversion option).
One implication of this interpretation is that the intermediary’s decision to
continue and exercise the conversion option can act as a credible signal to un-
informed investors that the firm’s prospects are good: this too seems consistent
with the empirical evidence on venture capital financing. Continuation finance is
often raised through IPOs,18 and venture capitalists are required to exercise their
conversion option at this point. Megginson and Weiss (1991), in their study of
320 venture-backed and 320 nonventure IPOs over the period 1983-87, find that
venture capitalists retain a majority of their equity after the IPO, and that the
underpricing of venture-backed IPOs is significantly less than the underpricing of
nonventure IPOs. They interpret this as evidence that venture capitalists certify
to investors the quality of the firms they bring to market. Their argument for
this certification hypothesis is based on reputational considerations: the idea is
that venture capitalists have an incentive to build a reputation for bringing high-
quality firms to market, which in turn will reduce the costs of taking firms public
in the future. The analysis of this paper suggests that venture capitalists’ certi-
17We require simply that Lm/L ≥ Rm/R, i.e. that the intermediary’s share of liquidation
proceeds be no less than his share of the project’s success returns.
18The analysis of contracts presented in the Appendix assumes, for ease of exposition, that
there is just one contract with uninformed investors, agreed at t = 0, and that uninformed
investors will then provide the required finance C1 at t = 1 if the decision is taken to continue
the project. The analysis can easily be modified to allow for continuation finance to be provided
by new uninformed investors at t = 1, as would be the case in an IPO. The point is that the
entrepreneur’s and the intermediary’s incentive constraints do not change, so that the results
described in the Propositions are not affected.
21
fication role does not rely only on reputation, but also on the design of financial
contracts, which provides the appropriate incentives for certification.
Finally, as noted in the introduction, it is worth emphasizing that while the
optimal collusion-proof contract can be implemented with convertible securities
or a combination of debt and equity, it cannot, in general, be implemented with
straight debt or straight equity : this may provide an explanation for the difference
between the financial claims typically held by venture capitalists (convertible se-
curities), and those held by business angels for whom the possibility of collusion
is not an issue (straight equity).19
5. Conclusions
Real-world venture capital contracts are varied, detailed, and complex, as shown
by the growing empirical literature. No single stylised theoretical model can hope
to explain all of the observed diversity and complexity; nevertheless, a number of
papers, including the present one, have made progress in this direction, by high-
lighting the role of certain key issues and trade-offs in venture capital financing.
The model developed here focused on three such interrelated issues: the need to
motivate venture capitalists to monitor effectively (thereby alleviating potential
entrepreneurial moral hazard problems); the need to provide appropriate incen-
tives to induce efficient continuation and refinancing decisions; and the need to
deter collusion between entrepreneurs and venture capitalists at the expense of
other investors.
Optimal financial contracts that take this interrelationship into account have
a number of features that correspond to observed characteristics of venture cap-
ital financing. Nevertheless, the present paper represents only a small step in, I
believe, the right direction. In particular, the issue of potential collusion, high-
lighted in this paper, merits further study. In future work, it would be interesting
to extend the analysis by considering whether and in what circumstances it might
be desirable to have more than one monitor. This could help to shed light on
the widespread practice of syndication. The distinction between venture capital-
ists’ certification and intermediation roles is also a very promising topic for future
research.
19See Fenn, Liang and Prowse (1998) on business angels and Gompers and Lerner (1999) and
Kaplan and Strömberg (2003) on venture capitalists.
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6. Appendix
Proofs of all the Propositions follow.
Proof of Proposition 1.
(a) (direct finance) At t=0 the entrepreneur proposes a contract CDS = {Af ,
Au, Y (γ), Lf , Lu, Rf , Ru} to uninformed investors (who for simplicity will be
treated as a single party in what follows). Af and Au represent the amounts
of capital invested in the project at t=0 by the entrepreneur and the investors,
respectively. The decision rule Y (γ) determines whether the project will be con-
tinued or liquidated at t=1, contingent on the realisation of γ. Specifically, the
variable Y (γ) takes the value one if the project is continued at t=1, with the
required expenditure C1 being provided by the investors; it takes the value zero
if the project is liquidated. The contract further specifies payments to be made
at t=1 if the project is liquidated (Lf and Lu), and at t=2 if the project is con-
tinued and succeeds (Rf and Ru). The entrepreneur’s problem is to maximise his
expected payoff subject to the relevant participation, incentive compatibility and
feasibility constraints, described below. It is straightforward to verify that any
solution to this problem would entail setting Y (γG) = 1 and Y (γB) = 0 (thereby
achieving ex post efficiency). Thus without loss of generality we can specify the
entrepreneur’s problem (P1) as follows:
Max pHγGRf + (1− pH)Lf −Af (6.1)
s.t. pHγGRf + (1− pH)Lf ≥ B + pLγGRf + (1− pL)Lf (6.2)
Rf +Ru = R (6.3)
Lf + Lu = L (6.4)
Af +Au = C0 (6.5)
pH(γGRu − C1) + (1− pH)Lu ≥ Au (6.6)
where expression (6.1) represents the entrepreneur’s expected payoff, condi-
tion (6.2) is the entrepreneur’s incentive compatibility constraint (ICC), ensuring
that he chooses the good project ex ante; conditions (6.3) to (6.5) are feasibility
constraints, and lastly condition (6.6) is the investors’ participation constraint.
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From the entrepreneur’s ICC we obtain the following condition for Rf :
Rf ≥ B/∆pγG + Lf/γG (6.7)
Using this, together with the condition
Lf ≥ 0 (6.8)
due to the entrepreneur’s limited liability, the maximum returns that can be
pledged to investors are derived from the feasibility constraints (6.4) and (6.5):
Lmaxu = L (6.9)
Rmaxu = R−B/∆pγG (6.10)
Substituting these upper bounds into expression (6.6) gives the maximum amount
of capital that can be raised from uninformed investors:
Amaxu = pH(γGR−B/∆p− C1) + (1− pH)L (6.11)
The project can only be financed if the entrepreneur has sufficient capital
to make up the difference between the required initial expenditure, C0, and the
maximum amount of capital that can be raised from investors, Amaxu . This gives
the following condition:
Af ≥ A∗ = C0 − pH(γGR−B/∆p− C1)− (1− pH)L (6.12)
When the above condition is satisfied, it can be easily checked that the following
is a solution to P1: let Af = A∗, Au = C0 −A∗, Y (γG) = 1, Y (γB) = 0, Lf = 0,
Lu = L, Rf = B/∆pγG, Ru = R−B/∆pγG.
(b) (mixed finance) I focus here on the case where direct finance is not feasible
(Af < A∗), so that the entrepreneur has to turn to an intermediary, who needs
to be given incentives to monitor. At t=0 the entrepreneur proposes a contract
CMS = {Af , Au, Am, Y (γ), Lf , Lu, Lm, Rf , Ru, Rm} to the intermediary and
the uninformed investors. The form of the contract is similar to the one for the
direct finance case described above, CDS; the difference is that it also specifies the
intermediary’s capital investment at t=0 (Am), his payoff at t=1 if the project
is liquidated (Lm), and his payoff at t=2 if the project succeeds (Rm). As was
the case for direct finance, it is straightforward to verify that any solution to the
entrepreneur’s problem would entail setting Y (γG) = 1 and Y (γB) = 0 (thereby
achieving ex post efficiency). Thus without loss of generality we can specify the
entrepreneur’s problem (P2) as follows:
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Max pHγGRf + (1− pH)Lf −Af (6.13)
s.t. pHγGRf + (1− pH)Lf ≥ b+ pLγGRf + (1− pL)Lf (6.14)
Rf +Ru +Rm = R (6.15)
Lf + Lu + Lm = L (6.16)
Af +Au +Am = C0 (6.17)
pH(γGRu − C1) + (1− pH)Lu ≥ Au (6.18)
pHγGRm + (1− pH)Lm ≥ c+ pLγGRm + (1− pL)Lm (6.19)
pHγGRm + (1− pH)Lm − c ≥ α2Am (6.20)
Expression (6.13) represents the entrepreneur’s expected payoff, while his in-
centive compatibility constraint is given by (6.14). Expressions (6.15) to (6.17) are
feasibility constraints, and (6.18) is the investors’ participation constraint. The
intermediary’s incentive compatibility and participation constraints are given by
(6.19) and (6.20), respectively.
The method of proof is the same as for (a) above: firstly, obtain lower bounds
for Rf , Rm, Lf and Lm, using the entrepreneur’s and the intermediary’s ICCs, to-
gether with limited liability. Secondly, using these lower bounds together with the
participation constraints, derive the minimum amount of entrepreneurial capital
required for the project to be undertaken. Notice that, since α2 ≥ 1, we can focus
without loss of generality on the case where the intermediary’s capital investment,
Am, is just equal to the minimum amount necessary to satisfy his participation
and incentive compatibility constraints; any additional external finance is raised
directly from investors.
From the entrepreneur’s ICC, together with limited liability, we have:
Rf ≥ b/∆pγG + Lf/γG (6.21)
Lf ≥ 0 (6.22)
and from the intermediary’s ICC, together with limited liability, we have:
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Rm ≥ c/∆pγG + Lm/γG (6.23)
Lm ≥ 0 (6.24)
Using the lower bounds implied by (6.23) and (6.24), and the intermediary’s
participation constraint, we obtain:
Am = cpL/α
2∆p (6.25)
Using conditions (6.21) to (6.24), together with the feasibility constraints (6.15)
and (6.16), gives the following upper bounds for Ru and Lu :
Rmaxu = R− (b+ c)/∆pγG (6.26)
Lmaxu = L (6.27)
Hence the maximum amount of capital that can be raised from investors is
obtained from their participation constraint:
Amaxu = L+ pH [γGR− C1 − L− (b+ c)/∆p] (6.28)
Expressions (6.17), (6.25) and (6.28) together imply that the project can only be
financed if the entrepreneur’s capital satisfies the following condition:
Af ≥ A∗∗(α) = C0 − L− pH [γGR− C1 − L− (b+ c)/∆p]− cpL/α2∆p (6.29)
When the above condition is satisfied, it can be easily checked that the following
is a solution to P2: let Af = A∗∗, Am = cpL/α2∆p, Au = C0 − Af − Am,
Y (γG) = 1, Y (γB) = 0, Lf = 0, Lm = 0, Lu = L, Rf = b/∆pγG, Rm = c/∆pγG,
Ru = R−Rf −Rm. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 2.
As in the mixed finance case without collusion (Proposition 1(b)), the en-
trepreneur at t=0 proposes a contract CMS = {Af , Au, Am, Y (γ), Lf , Lu, Lm,
Rf , Ru, Rm} to the intermediary and the uninformed investors. The difference is
that the contract needs to be collusion-proof. Hence the entrepreneur’s problem,
P3, is the same as in the no-collusion case (P2), given by expressions (6.13) to
(6.20), except for the intermediary’s ICC, (6.19), which is modified as follows:
pHγGRm + (1− pH)Lm ≥ c+ pLγGRm + (1− pL)Lm + kS (6.30)
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where S is the maximum side transfer that the entrepreneur would be willing to
make to the intermediary to induce him not to monitor, and is equal to:
S = B −∆p(γGRf − Lf) (6.31)
The lower bounds forRf and Lf are unchanged relative to P2, and can be obtained
from expressions (6.21) and (6.22), assuming they hold with equality. Substituting
these in (6.31), and then using (6.30) and (6.31), we obtain the following condition
for Rm :
Rm ≥ c/∆pγG + Lm/γG + k(B − b)/∆pγG (6.32)
while limited liability implies, as before, that Lm ≥ 0. The amount of capi-
tal provided by the intermediary can therefore be derived from his participation
constraint:
Am = cpL/α
2∆p+ pHk(B − b)/α2∆p (6.33)
The maximum amount of capital that can be raised from investors is given by:
Amaxu = L+ pH [γGR− C1 − L− (b+ c+ k(B − b))/∆p] (6.34)
Further manipulation shows that the project can be financed if and only if:
Af ≥ A∗∗1 (α) = A∗∗(α) + (1− 1/α2)pHk(B − b)/∆p] (6.35)
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 3.
At t=0 the entrepreneur proposes a contract CDA = {Af , Au, Y (γ), Lf , Lu,
Rf , Ru} to uninformed investors. The contract takes the same general form as the
direct finance contract under symmetric information, CDS (described in the proof
to Proposition 1(a)), except that now γ is no longer verifiable at t=1, so that
the decision rule Y (γ) must be incentive-compatible. Specifically, since only the
entrepreneur observes γ, the continuation/liquidation decision must be taken by
the entrepreneur, who must be given appropriate incentives. It is straightforward
to verify that even in this case any solution to the entrepreneur’s problem would
entail setting Y (γG) = 1 and Y (γB) = 0
The entrepreneur’s problem under symmetric information (P1), described by
expressions (6.1) to (6.6), is therefore modified through the addition of the fol-
lowing ex post incentive compatibility constraints:
γGRf ≥ Lf (6.36)
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Lf ≥ γBRf (6.37)
ensuring that the entrepreneur prefers continuation in the good state and liqui-
dation in the bad state. Using these ex post ICCs together with the ex ante ICC
(7.2) the lower bounds for Rf and Lf can be obtained:
Rf ≥ B/∆p∆γ (6.38)
Lf ≥ γBB/∆p∆γ (6.39)
Using these together with the feasibility constraints and the investors’ participa-
tion constraint ((6.3), (6.4) and (6.6)) the maximum amount of capital investment
by the investors can be derived as:
Amaxu = L+ pH [γGR− C1 − L]− [pHγG + (1− pH)γB]B/∆γ∆p (6.40)
The project can therefore be financed if and only if:
Af ≥ A∗A = A∗ + γBB/∆γ∆p (6.41)
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 4.
Denote by C1 = {Af , Au, Am, Ψ1, Lf , Lu, Lm, Rf , Ru, Rm} the contract
proposed by the entrepreneur to the intermediary and the uninformed investors
at t=0. The contract takes the same general form as the mixed finance contract
under symmetric information, CMS (described in the proof to Proposition 1(b)),
except that it cannot specify a decision rule for the continuation decision, Y (γ),
contingent on γ. Instead, it specifies a mechanism Ψ1, to be played at t=1, which
is designed to implement the same outcome as the optimal contingent decision
rule Y (γ) in contract CMS: that is, it is designed to ensure that the project is
continued when γ = γG, with payoffs Rf , Ru, and Rm in the event of success and
zero otherwise, and liquidated when γ = γB, with payoffs Lf , Lu, and Lm.
Consider the following mechanism Ψ1:
• Stage 1 : the intermediary chooses between continuation and liquidation. If
he chooses liquidation, the project is liquidated; payoffs are Lf , Lu, and Lm.
If the intermediary chooses continuation, go on to stage 2.
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• Stage 2 : the entrepreneur decides whether to agree with the intermediary
or disagree. If he agrees, the project is continued, investors provide the re-
quired finance C1, and payoffs are Rf , Ru, and Rm if the project succeeds;
zero otherwise. If the entrepreneur disagrees, the project is liquidated; the
entrepreneur receives γBRf+², the investors any remaining liquidation pro-
ceeds, and the intermediary zero.
For Ψ1 to work, it has to satisfy the following conditions20:
γGRf ≥ γBRf + ² (6.42)
γBRf + ² ≥ γBRf (6.43)
Lm ≥ 0 (6.44)
γGRm ≥ Lm (6.45)
Conditions (6.42) and (6.43) ensure that in stage 2 the entrepreneur agrees
if γ = γG, and disagrees if γ = γB. Conditions (6.44) and (6.45) ensure that
in stage 1 the intermediary prefers to liquidate if γ = γB and to continue if
γ = γG. Clearly ² can always be chosen to satisfy (6.42) and (6.43). Comparing
the above conditions with those for problem P2, given in the proof for Proposition
1(b), shows that they impose no additional restriction: it is therefore possible to
implement the lower bounds for Rf , Rm, Lf , and Lm implied by (6.21) to (6.24).
Thus the minimum level of entrepreneurial capital required for the project to be
feasible satisfies the condition:
Af ≥ A∗∗(α) (6.46)
as was the case under symmetric information.
Notice that the particular mechanism Ψ1 described above is just one of the
possible sequential mechanisms that can be used to implement the lower bounds
for Rf , Rm, Lf , and Lm implied by (6.21) to (6.24). The key characteristic of
any such mechanism is that it exploits subgame perfection to elicit information
20To be consistent with the approach followed in the rest of the paper, which adopts the
standard approach in principal-agent problems, I require only weak optimality - hence the weak
inequalities. If strong optimality (i.e. unique implementation) is required (as is generally the
case in the literature on subgame perfect implementation, e.g. Moore and Repullo (1988), Moore
(1992)), these should be replaced by strict inequalities.
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from the two informed parties (essentially by giving one party incentives to ”call
the other’s bluff” if the other tries to ”cheat”), implying that the project will be
continued if, and only if, the two parties agree. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 5.
As in the no-collusion case examined in Proposition 4, the entrepreneur at
t=0 proposes a contract C2 = {Af , Au, Am, Ψ2, Lf , Lu, Lm, Rf , Ru, Rm} to the
intermediary and the uninformed investors. The difference is that the contract
needs to be collusion-proof. Once we allow for the possibility of collusion, the
entrepreneur and the intermediary can always agree to make the same announce-
ments when γ = γB as when γ = γG, giving the outcome {continuation, success
payoffs Rf , Rm} with expected payoffs equal to γBRf , γBRm. Thus it is no longer
possible to implement the equilibrium payoffs that were optimal when collusion
was ruled out a priori. To implement the optimal continuation/liquidation deci-
sion while minimising the returns pledged to the entrepreneur (hence minimising
the need for entrepreneurial capital), we must have:
Lf = 0 (6.47)
and set Lm so that the intermediary prefers liquidation to continuation when
γ = γB (in particular, so that he cannot be induced to collude with the en-
trepreneur to choose continuation):
Lm ≥ γBRm + kγBRf (6.48)
The intermediary’s ex ante ICC (see below) requires that the intermediary prefer
continuation when γ = γG (otherwise he has no incentives to monitor). Without
loss of generality we can therefore specify the mechanism Ψ2 as follows:
• at t=1 the intermediary decides whether to continue the project or liquidate
it. If the project is liquidated, the entrepreneur receives Lf = 0, the inter-
mediary Lm = γBRm+ kγBRf , and the investors any remaining liquidation
proceeds. If the project is continued, investors provide the required finance
C1, and payoffs are given by Rf , Ru, Rm (0) in the event of success (failure).
The contract (C2) must also prevent collusion ex ante, to ensure that the
intermediary monitors (as in Proposition 2). The intermediary’s ex ante ICC is
therefore given by (6.30). The lower bounds for Rf and Lf are unchanged, and
are given by (6.21) and (6.22), implying that the lower bound for Rm is given by
(6.32); substituting for Lm using (6.48) gives the following condition:
Rm ≥ c/∆p∆γ + γBkb/γG∆p∆γ + k(B − b)/∆p∆γ (6.49)
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Let Rminm = c/∆p∆γ + γBkb/γG∆p∆γ + k(B − b)/∆p∆γ. Then (using also
(6.48)) the amount of capital provided by the intermediary is equal to:
Am = [pHγG + (1− pH)γB]Rminm /α2 + (1− pH)kγBb/α2∆pγG − c/α2 (6.50)
Further manipulation shows that the project can be financed if and only if:
Af ≥ A∗∗2 (α) = A∗∗1 (α) + γB(c+ kB)][1− (1/α2)]/∆p∆γ (6.51)
Q.E.D.
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